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Abstract 
 
The two most prominent individual differences researchers of the twentieth century were 
Hans J. Eysenck and Raymond B. Cattell. Both were giants of scientific psychology, each 
publishing scores of books and hundreds of empirical peer-reviewed journal articles. 
Influenced by Hebb’s distinction between physiological (Intelligence A) and experiential 
(Intelligence B), Eysenck focused on discovering the underlying biological substrata of 
intelligence. Analogously, Cattell proposed the Gf-Gc theory which distinguishes 
between fluid and crystallised intelligence. Cattell’s Culture Fair Intelligence Test 
(CFIT), a measure primarily of fluid intelligence, was constructed specifically to 
minimise differences in test bias in IQ scores between different ethnic/racial groups. 
Within the personality realm, Eysenck adopted a pragmatic three-factor model as 
measured via the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ-R) and its variants. In 
contrast, Cattell employed a lexical approach that resulted in a large number of primary 
and secondary normal and abnormal personality trait dimensions, measured via the 
Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF), and the corresponding Clinical 
Analysis Questionnaire (CAQ), respectively. Recent molecular genetics findings provide 
empirical confirmation of Eysenck and Cattell’s positions on the biological 
underpinnings of personality and ability traits, allowing an improved understanding of the 
causes of individual differences.  
 
Keywords: Individual differences; Personality; Cognitive abilities; Gf-Gc theory; Culture 
Fair Intelligence Test; PEN model; EPQ-R; 16PF; CAQ. 
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The study of personality and individual differences in the second half of the 
twentieth century was significantly influenced by two prominent figures:  Hans J. 
Eysenck and Raymond B. Cattell. Both have their roots in British psychology. While 
Eysenck gained his PhD under Burt’s supervision at University College, London, Cattell 
earned his PhD at King’s College, London under the supervision of Francis Aveling - 
then President of the British Psychological Society. Both Eysenck and Cattell were key 
players in the movement to promote scientific psychology, as currently advocated 
expressly by the Association for Psychological Science. As Boyle (1998, “Remembering 
R. B. Cattell,” para. 2) stated,  
Two of the greatest and most prolific contributors to the science of human 
personality during the 20th century were Professor Raymond B. Cattell, Ph.D., 
D.Sc., and Professor Hans J. Eysenck, Ph.D., D.Sc.  While Cattell pursued his 
academic career in prestigious USA universities (Harvard, Clark, Illinois), 
Eysenck undertook his lifelong work at the Institute of Psychiatry, University of 
London.  It is indeed ironic that the world would lose the two most eminent 
personality researchers within the space of only a few weeks. So prominent were 
these two men, that their work is now enshrined in the Cattellian and Eysenckian 
Schools of Psychology, respectively.  
 
Both Eysenck and Cattell were ranked among the most highly cited psychologists 
of the twentieth century. Indeed, Eysenck was the most highly cited psychologist of his 
generation (Gray, 1997). Based on the peer-reviewed journal literature alone (Haggbloom 
et al., 2002, Table 1), Eysenck was the 3rd most highly cited psychologist (after Freud, 
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and Piaget, respectively), while Cattell was 7th most highly cited. In relation to Cattell’s 
impact on the field of psychology, Eysenck (1985, p. 76) remarked that,  
Cattell has been one of the most prolific writers in psychology since Wilhelm 
Wundt….According to the Citation Index, he is one of the ten most cited 
psychologists, and this is true with regard to not only citations in social science 
journals but also those in science journals generally. Of the two hundred and fifty 
most cited scientists, only three psychologists made the grade, namely, Sigmund 
Freud in the first place, then the reviewer [H.J. Eysenck], and then Cattell. Thus 
there is no question that Cattell has made a tremendous impression on psychology 
and science in general. 
  
Illustrative of the esteem in which these two giants of psychology were held by their 
peers, Buchanan (2010, p. 4) wrote about Eysenck, 
There can be little argument about the importance of Eysenck as an historical 
figure. His name ranks alongside American contemporaries such as Gordon 
Allport, B.F. Skinner, and Raymond Cattell...and he hardly had a rival on the UK 
scene... 
 
Likewise, Horn (2001, p. 72) wrote about Cattell, 
The seven past-presidents of the American Psychological Association who 
selected him, despite his controversial writings, for a lifetime contributions’ 
award were correct in their judgment. He must rank among the most important 
contributors to psychological science. 
 
 
5 
 
 
Clearly, both Eysenck and Cattell have left their mark on the study of human 
intelligence and personality. Eysenck’s contribution to the assessment of intelligence is 
augmented by his various attempts to discover its biological bases. Cattell will be 
remembered largely for his ideas about cognitive functioning and his theory of fluid and 
crystallised intelligence. 
With respect to personality assessment, although Eysenck utilised both self-report 
measures and psychophysiological measures, Cattell systematically constructed measures 
of personality traits in different media of measurement – Life-Record including ratings of 
others (L-data); Questionnaire (Q-data); and Test (T-data). With regard to T-data, Cattell 
and Warburton (1967) compiled a list of over 2000 objective test measures of personality 
and motivation, and constructed the Objective-Analytic Test Battery (OAB) that 
measures 10 factor-analytically derived personality trait constructs – see Schuerger 
(2008).  
It has often been assumed that Eysenck used his knowledge of psychopathology 
to derive theoretically-based “top-down” measures of personality traits, whereas Cattell 
relied on an atheoretical “bottom-up” lexical approach. However, Eysenck’s approach 
was not entirely theoretically driven. As Goldberg wrote to Eysenck (February 6, 1995; 
see van Kampen, 2009, p. 13),  
It is not clear to the world at large how your PEN model is not well described as 
an example of the heuristic school, given that you explicitly adopted ‘some 
psychiatric system of classification’ for [Psychoticism and Neuroticism], and you 
used your own ‘notion of what traits might be important’ to select [Extraversion]. 
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Nevertheless, Eysenck’s pragmatic approach clearly contrasted with Cattell’s 
emphasis on the empirical lexical approach. Accordingly, the measures and theories of 
personality structure that resulted from their respective factor-analytic studies emerged 
with some distinct differences. Boyle (1998, “Remembering R. B. Cattell,” para. 2) 
pointed out that,  
Critics of the psychology of individual differences have often claimed naively that 
the use of factor analysis in test construction has ‘only led to confusion -- since 
Eysenck found three factors, while Cattell found 16 factors’ within the personality 
domain. Yet … Eysenck and Cattell were talking about personality measurement 
at different levels within the hierarchical trait model. Cattell concentrated on 
primary factors, while Eysenck focused on broader secondary dimensions. Indeed, 
at the second-order 16PF level, the degree of communality between the 
Eysenckian and Cattellian factors was striking!  
 
Clearly, Eysenck and Cattell’s contributions to the delineation of personality structure 
were compatible. As Eysenck (1984, p. 336) himself stated,  
The Cattell and Eysenck constructs and theories should be seen, not as mutually 
contradictory, but as complementary and mutually supportive. 
 
On the other hand, Cattell was not so willing to readily accept the compatibility between 
his and Eysenck’s approaches. According to Cattell (1986, p. 153), 
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Eysenck’s resort to 3 factors is shown to be theoretically faulty and unable to equal 
the criterion predictions obtainable from the 16PF primaries. 
 
Indeed, the empirical evidence does support Cattell’s argument about the greater 
predictive variance obtainable from a larger number of primary factors than from a 
smaller number of broad secondary factors (Mershon & Gorsuch, 1988).  
Eysenck and Cattell investigated individual differences using the hypothetico-
deductive method (or inductive-hypothetico-deductive method – Cattell, 1978). In other 
words, Eysenck attached considerable importance to theoretically-driven research, 
whereas Cattell was much more skeptical about theory preceding empirical evidence. 
Although, historically, there had been a gap between differential and experimental 
psychology (Cronbach, 1957), Eysenck (1997a) explicitly combined both experimental 
and correlational approaches, while Cattell was at the forefront in promoting multivariate 
experimental research (Cattell, 1966a; Nesselroade & Cattell, 1988).   
Both Eysenck and Cattell subscribed to the prevailing positivist paradigm and to 
the nomothetic approach (e.g., Allport, 1937; Cattell, 1973; Eysenck, 1954; Piekkola, 
2011). It is worth examining this predilection in some detail if only because committing 
one’s research program to a particular paradigm inevitably alienates it from other 
paradigms. The twofold temptation may then arise to turn a blind eye to the limitations of 
the chosen paradigm and to attempt to disparage alternatives (cf. Eysenck, 1986). Yet, 
Eysenck’s critique of non-positivist approaches such as psychoanalysis (Eysenck, 1952), 
contrasted with his willingness to entertain other controversial topics, such as 
parapsychology (Eysenck, 1982b) and astrology (Eysenck & Nias, 1982). Presumably, 
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one of the reasons for Eysenck’s dislike of psychodynamic psychology was that its tenets 
could not easily be put to the empirical test (see Kline, 1972), whereas Eysenck 
considered that valid experiments could be carried out to test parapsychological and 
astrological predictions.   
However, the chasm between nomothetic and idiographic approaches is not 
conducive for a holistic psychology with the individual person as its main focus. The 
tendency of trait psychologists to align with nomothetic approaches, which they equate 
with ‘scientific,’ and to distance themselves from idiographic approaches, which they 
equate with ‘unscientific,’ is problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly, it vastly 
underestimates the ineradicable contributions of giants of psychology, such as Freud, 
Jung, Maslow, and Piaget, who worked mostly within the idiographic tradition. Secondly, 
and perhaps more importantly, the uncritical overreliance on nomothetic approaches, as 
typically applied in mainstream personality psychology, has brought about a “triumph of 
the aggregate” (Danziger, 1990) that is threatening to establish a personality psychology 
devoid of the person. 
Cattell and Eysenck worked at a time when the foundations of contemporary 
academic psychology as we know it were being laid. They spearheaded the movement 
towards a quantitative psychology, which they perceived as equivalent to a scientific 
psychology and which eventually became the dominant paradigm. Their key ideas for a 
scientific (meaning positivist) psychology, were enthusiastically shared by many others, 
and gradually became central to individual differences research, specifically, and to 
academic psychology, more generally.   
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How much of this influence actually originated with Cattell and Eysenck and how 
much merely reflected the zeitgeist of the time is difficult to tell. In the 1950s and 1960s 
when the two personality psychologists became established, psychology was 
characterized by a nervousness to imitate the apparent success of the natural sciences, 
which had blithely espoused a philosophy of materialism (Sheldrake, 2013; Whitehead, 
1925/2011).  This caused an unrestrained import of methods, concepts, and technologies 
from the natural sciences at the expense of methodologies that are prima facie more 
compatible with a psychology of the individual person (e.g., Stern, 1911), such as 
introspection and psychoanalysis.    
Cattell and Eysenck were key players in the movement to emulate the natural 
sciences even though many natural scientists seemed loath to consent to such advances.  
Yet the question of whether the methodologies of the natural sciences are appropriate for 
the investigation of psychological phenomena has always loomed large (e.g., Bickhard, 
1992; Snygg, 1955). 
The dominant paradigm in personality research – differential psychology – has 
not grappled well with challenges such that knowledge about individual differences is not 
the same as knowledge about individuals, that individual behaviour cannot be explained 
in terms of differences between individuals (Lamiell, 1997), that ordinal measures are not 
necessarily quantitative (Michell, 2009), and that psychometrics lacks valid units of 
measurement (Kline, 1997). It has been all too easy for differential psychology to “sweep 
these issues under the carpet”.  
Despite these caveats, here we outline some of the many contributions of these 
two important figures to the field of individual differences and point to some areas of 
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contemporary research influenced by their work. We also mention a couple of events that 
brought both Eysenck and Cattell into the limelight within the broader community, as 
well as re-examining new evidence from molecular genetics that provides vindication for 
Eysenck and Cattell’s focus on the biological basis of complex trait dimensions. 
Eysenck on Intelligence and its Biological Substrata 
Eysenck was from the ‘London School’ of psychology with its lineage of Galton, 
Spearman, and Burt.  Eysenck’s hypothesis was that general intelligence (g) is underlain 
by mental speed, which he tested through various response and inspection time protocols 
aided by complex algorithms (e.g., Barrett, Petrides & Eysenck, 1998).  Within the 
experimental psychology paradigm, Eysenck strongly advocated a theoretical and 
laboratory-based approach for intelligence research (Eysenck, 1967a). 
In the 1960s, Guilford’s Structure of the Intellect (SOI) model became popular 
although Eysenck previously had similar ideas (Eysenck, 1971). In Eysenck’s model one 
dimension corresponded to content (verbal, numerical, and spatial), the other to mental 
processes (reasoning, memory, and perception). The third dimension was “quality” which 
refers to the nature of test administration – the distinction between ‘speeded’ and ‘power’ 
tests. However, neither Guilford’s nor Eysenck’s models of ability structure have 
survived the test of time, and subsequent studies with psychometric tests of intelligence 
have not derived factors corresponding to either model (see critique of SOI model – 
Brody & Brody, 1976, pp. 43-57). 
 The biological underpinnings of intelligence depend on genetic potential 
expressed through developmental and neurochemical pathways (Eysenck, 1982, 1998). 
Biological correlates of intelligence can be found in measurements from the 
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electroencephalogram (EEG), averaged evoked potential (AEP), contingent negative 
variation (CNV), galvanic skin response (GSR), reaction time (RT) and other methods 
including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 
 Psychometric intelligence is measured by IQ tests. While related to biological 
intelligence, it is also influenced by cultural and experiential factors, family upbringing, 
socio-economic status, education, and the like. Approximately 30-40% of the total 
variance is accounted for by non-genetic influences (Deary, 2000). The relative 
importance of genetic and environmental influences on psychometric intelligence varies 
as a function of age: genetic factors account for approximately 20% of individual 
differences in intelligence in infancy but 80% in later adulthood (Plomin & Deary, 2015). 
 Finally, there is social intelligence (practical intelligence) – the application of 
intelligence in everyday social life and work (Sternberg et al., 2000). Social intelligence 
involves factors additional to psychometric intelligence. For example, even if an 
individual has high IQ but is an alcoholic, is mentally or physically ill, has poor 
education, and/or has low motivation/drive, it is unlikely that s/he will be a high achiever. 
Evidently, much of Eysenck’s empirical work was reductionist in linking 
intelligence to its biological substrata. Although Eysenck employed several measures, the 
bulk of his work focused on mental speed and EEG measures. 
 Mental Speed. Eysenck’s (1967a) article, which examined Galton’s hypothesis 
about the close link between mental speed and intelligence, proved to be quite influential 
and timely. His article promoted the ideas which he had developed in collaboration with 
Furneaux, who had published a paper in a book edited by Eysenck (1960), while an 
equally important work by Eysenck’s student (P. O. White), subsequently appeared in 
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another book (Eysenck, 1973). All these works assumed three components of intelligence: 
speed and two aspects of personality labelled as persistency (tendency to invest effort 
when the solution is not easy) and error checking (tendency to check the answer to an 
item prior to registering it).  
Eysenck’s suggestion to investigate mental speed fell on a fertile ground. In the 
1960s, a revitalised cognitive psychology began to employ RT measures. Its usefulness 
was demonstrated in Saul Sternberg’s studies of memory search. The advent of micro-
computers subsequently facilitated precise measurements of timed performance. While 
Eysenck was only marginally interested in new developments in experimental cognitive 
psychology, his plea to examine Galton’s ideas was taken seriously by others. In several 
studies, Jensen (1982) demonstrated that both simple RT and choice RT correlate about 
0.20 to 0.30 with psychometric measures of intelligence. However, the relationship 
between IQ and mental speed is insufficiently strong to indicate that it might lead to a 
comprehensive understanding of the biological underpinnings of intelligence. 
 Initially, Eysenck viewed more intelligent people as having faster thinking, 
information transmission and processing. Jensen also subscribed to this notion, but 
believed that mental speed is important because of the role of working memory in 
thinking. Since information in working memory fades quickly, people with higher 
intelligence and faster mental speed can perform more operations in a limited timespan 
than those with slower processing speed. 
 Towards the end of his life, Eysenck modified his account of the relationship 
between mental speed and intelligence due to finding notable correlations between 
intelligence test (IQ) scores and measures of variability in RT. Over the many trials 
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needed for reliable RT measurement, some individuals show considerable instability 
from trial to trial, although more intelligent individuals generally show relatively small 
variability. Eysenck proposed that less intelligent individuals transmit information less 
efficiently with a greater probability of errors occurring. However, the finding of high 
correlations between measures of mental speed and measures of variability of speed calls 
for a single rather than two distinct mechanisms (i.e., speed and probability of synaptic 
error) to explain the observed phenomena. Roberts and Stankov (1999) showed that 
mental speed measures define several distinct factors, such that mental speed is not the 
basic process of intelligence. An alternative capacity view that emphasises the role of 
attention and working memory instead of speed in intelligence has also gathered support 
(Stankov, Boyle & Cattell, 1995). 
 Electroencephalography and intelligence. Towards the end of the 1960s, Eysenck 
started using a more direct (psychophysiological) measure of biological intelligence – the 
EEG. Two methods were employed. In the first, the EEG was recorded while the 
individual was in a resting position. Significant but relatively small correlations 
(comparable to those reported with RT) were obtained between measures of intelligence 
and EEG parameters. In the second method, the person was again resting but a light (or a 
tone) was presented at certain time intervals. The light evokes a change in the EEG 
records which are averaged over many trials to obtain the “average evoked potential” 
(AEP). In Eysenck’s studies, various AEP measures were correlated with intelligence test 
scores. Eysenck with his students, Hendrickson and Hendrickson (1980), developed a 
new AEP measure reflecting the signal complexity (extent of small departures from the 
smooth AEP recording). Eysenck proposed that the differences in complexity of AEP 
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recordings (like RTs) are related to the transmission of signals over the synapses within 
the central nervous system. In his autobiography, Eysenck reported correlations between 
0.30 and 0.40 in a study undertaken with children (Eysenck, 1997b). While failures to 
replicate Hendrickson and Hendrickson’s findings initially were thought to be due to 
subtle differences in methodology used across different laboratories (Barrett & Eysenck, 
1992a), there were also failures to replicate within the same institution from which the 
original findings had been obtained (Barrett & Eysenck, 1992b). 
 Some AEP studies point to another way that speed may be important for 
intelligence. Using fast Gamma waves, Stankov et al. (2006) correlated the speed of 
synchronisation (or “tuning-in”) between different brain regions involved in processing a 
particular stimulus. Following Hebb (1949), it was expected that individuals with higher 
intelligence test scores would show faster activation of distinct brain regions involved in 
a particular cognitive activity. High correlations between IQ scores and speed of 
synchronization were indeed found (Stankov et al., 2006). While a recent meta-analysis 
(Basten, Hilger & Fiebach, 2015) found little evidence that high intelligence is associated 
with greater neural efficiency, it did provide convincing evidence that integration of 
frontal and parietal brain regions is greater among highly intelligent individuals. 
Cattell and Non-cognitive Correlates of Intelligence 
While Eysenck’s work on intelligence was influenced by Hebb (1949) who 
postulated the existence of Intelligence A (physiological), and Intelligence B 
(experiential), Cattell’s Gf-Gc theory (Cattell, 1963; Horn & Cattell, 1966) analogously 
distinguished between fluid intelligence (Gf) – (broad ability to reason, form concepts, 
and solve problems using unfamiliar information or novel procedures) and crystallised 
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intelligence (Gc) – (the ability to reason using previously learned knowledge or 
procedures) – (see Brody & Brody, 1976). Subsequent empirical work led to the 
identification of several additional broad cognitive factors including quantitative ability 
(Gq), reading and writing ability (Grw), short-term memory (Gsm), long-term storage 
and retrieval (Glr), visual processing (Gv), auditory processing (Ga), processing speed 
(Gs) and decision/RT speed (Gt) – now known as the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory 
of intelligence (see Schneider & McGrew, 2012).  
Cattell (with wife Karen) founded the Institute for Personality and Ability Testing 
(IPAT), which produced many psychometric tests of intelligence and cognitive abilities, 
including the historic Culture Fair Intelligence Test (CFIT), and the Comprehensive 
Ability Battery (CAB), among others (see Cattell & Johnson, 1986). 
Cattell (1987) was interested in processes that led to the emergence of crystallised 
from fluid intelligence. Cattell’s Investment theory posits that individual differences 
observed in the development of skills and knowledge (Gc) are partially attributed to the 
“investment” of Gf in various aspects of the learning process. Investment theory also 
suggests that non-cognitive traits and dispositions including interests, motivation and 
personality all affect cognitive abilities. This set up the stage for exploring links between 
cognitive and non-cognitive processes. One extension was the Process, Personality, 
Intelligence and Knowledge (PPIK) theory (Ackerman, 1996) which elaborates on 
Cattell’s original ideas. Another extension derives from the efforts of educationists to 
identify the best non-cognitive predictors of achievement and intelligence. From among 
the many non-cognitive variables considered, those related to self-beliefs (i.e., confidence, 
self-efficacy and anxiety) proved to be the most important (Stankov, 2013). 
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Measurement of Personality 
Eysenck aimed to place personality trait factors within a psychobiological 
network of constructs (Eysenck, 1967b), dictating his preference for interpreting 
somewhat crude unrotated centroid factors, in contrast to Cattell who employed optimal 
factor analytic procedures and rotated factors to maximum simple structure (Cattell, 
1978). Cattell pioneered some of the now standard factor-analytic techniques such as the 
Scree test (Cattell, 1962, 1966b). However, aiming for definitional precision, Cattell 
labelled his factors idiosyncratically, thereby inadvertently distancing his work from 
mainstream psychology. 
  As indicated earlier, the early stages of Eysenck’s attempts to describe 
personality were by no means entirely “top-down” or theory-driven. He was influenced 
by earlier theorists (e.g., Jung) and by previously devised questionnaires (see Eysenck & 
M. Eysenck, 1985). The Maudsley Personality Inventory (MPI) included several items to 
assess extraversion that were similar to items previously used by Guilford. The three 
broad factors Eysenck identified - Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Psychoticism - became 
the focus of an international research program (e.g., see Barrett, Petrides, S. Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1998).  
Eysenck constructed numerous personality measures, among which the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire, in its various forms is the most widely recognised (Eysenck, 
Eysenck & Barrett, 1985). Furnham, S. Eysenck, and Saklofske (2008) provided reasons 
why many of Eysenck’s measures remain in use today:  (1) they focus on broad factors 
that can be easily integrated into wider nomological networks; (2) they strive to reach 
beyond mere descriptions to provide actual explanations of processes; (3) they have been 
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validated in many empirical studies; (4) they have been widely applied across different 
disciplines; and (5) they have undergone continued rectification. Eysenck’s self-report 
questionnaires include the Maudsley Medical Questionnaire (MMQ), the Maudsley 
Personality Inventory (MPI), the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI), the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire (EPQ), the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire - Revised 
(EPQ-R), the shorted form (EPQ-R-S), and the Eysenck Personality Profiler (EPP).  
While Eysenck focused on broad personality trait dimensions - Extraversion, 
Neuroticism and Psychoticism, Cattell focused on primary trait dimensions, although at 
the 16PF second-order level, five broad personality factors were labelled Extraversion, 
Anxiety/Neuroticism, Tough Poise, Independence, and Control, respectively (H. Cattell 
& Mead, 2008; Krug & Johns, 1986). The first two line up with Eysenck’s Extraversion 
and Neuroticism factors, and the corresponding Big Five dimensions (Goldberg, 1993; 
Saucier, 2008). Yet, both Eysenck (1992a) and Cattell (1995) had severely criticised the 
Big Five model (see Boyle, 1989, 2008) which accounts for less than 60% of the variance 
in the normal trait sphere alone (Boyle, Stankov & Cattell, 1995, p. 432; Boyle, 2008, p. 
298). 
Aside from producing psychometric measures of intelligence, IPAT also 
generated many personality instruments and their downward extensions including the 
Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF, HSPQ, ESPQ); the Clinical Analysis 
Questionnaire (CAQ) – providing measures of 12 abnormal personality traits in addition 
to the 16PF factors; the Objective-Analytic Test Battery (OAB)  – 10 objective tests of 
personality trait constructs;  the Motivation Analysis Test (MAT, SMAT, CMAT) – an 
objective test of 10 dynamic motivational trait constructs; the Eight State Questionnaire 
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(8SQ) – which measures eight clinically important emotional/mood states. The 16PF is a 
widely used measure of normal personality traits which has been adapted for use in 
numerous languages (Boyle & Barton, 2008).  
One important difference between the Cattell and Eysenck models of personality 
is related to the conceptualisation and measurement of Psychoticism. Using factor 
analytic methodology, Cattell constructed the multidimensional CAQ (revised as the 
Psychological Evaluation Personality Questionnaire or PEPQ) – (see Krug, 2008).  In 
contrast, Eysenck focused on a single broad abnormal personality factor – Psychoticism – 
as measured in the EPQ and EPQ-R instruments. 
The question of what the Psychoticism scale really measures (Eysenck, 1992b; 
Eysenck, Eysenck & Barrett, 1985; Ortet et al., 1999) remains controversial. Its score 
distribution shows positive skewness, and lower item homogeneity (the scale is 
composed of relatively unrelated traits) than either the Extraversion or Neuroticism 
scales. Indeed, one of the present authors (GJB) in a brief visit with Eysenck at the 
Institute of Psychiatry in 1988 argued that measurement of a single Psychoticism trait 
seemed problematic given the occurrence of distinctly different forms of psychotic 
illness, and the fact that Cattell had empirically delineated 12 separate abnormal trait 
factors. Despite these arguments, Eysenck maintained his position that Psychoticism was 
a unidimensional factor. 
Ibáñez, Ortet and Moro (2000) compared the bias of different Spanish versions of 
the Psychoticism scale. As expected from Cattell’s work with the CAQ, factor analyses 
of the Psychoticism, Extraversion and Neuroticism scales of the EPQ-R indicated a larger 
heterogeneity of the Psychoticism scale as compared with the other two scales. When 
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more socially acceptable Psychoticism items are included, there is a slight reduction in 
scale bias. However, despite Eysenck’s assurances as to the validity of the Psychoticism 
scale, conceptual and psychometric issues remain unresolved (M. Eysenck, 2016). 
Eysenck’s research into personality and coping (see Marqués et al., 2005), and his 
research into cancer and coronary heart disease enriched health psychology, generating 
extensive debate, and quite often controversies, such as his finding of multiple synergistic 
causal factors in smoking-related illnesses (e.g., Eysenck, 1991a). As with other topics he 
researched, and while certain detractors have questioned Eysenck’s objectivity in his 
research into personality, stress and physical disease using Grossarth-Maticek’s rather 
unwieldy epidemiological data sets, the fact is that remaining true to character, Eysenck 
always carefully and logically considered the empirical evidence in attempting to solve 
controversial issues and advance psychology as a science (e.g., see Eysenck, 1991b, 
1993). After carefully considering all the disparaging criticisms and the likely impact on 
the outcomes obtained, Eysenck, 1993, p. 73) concluded that,  
The Grossarth-Maticek data are genuine – even though at times marred by errors 
that fortunately make no difference to the overall conclusions.  
 
Rather than somewhat pedantic, unending criticism, and in order to settle the 
controversy once and for all, detractors would do well to undertake independent 
replication studies on multiple large samples to ascertain the veracity or otherwise of 
Eysenck and Grossarth-Maticek’s findings. 
The impact of Eysenck and Cattell’s work is readily apparent in contemporary 
research programs, such as that of trait emotional intelligence, where we can witness the 
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use of factor analysis for conceptualisation (Petrides, Pita & Kokkinaki, 2007) and the 
investigation of constructs from multiple perspectives (Petrides et al., 2016). While there 
are many measures of emotional intelligence, most consist, in part, of a combination of 
low neuroticism and high extraversion (Matthews, Zeidner & Roberts, 2004). However, 
such research programs represent a continuation of Eysenck’s and Cattell’s loftiest ideals, 
and aim to integrate the research approaches that both these pioneers advocated.  
Controversies that Spilled beyond Academic Psychology 
The views of both Eysenck and Cattell particularly in relation to their scientific 
curiosity about ethnic differences in intelligence test scores or their speculations about 
eugenics have been maligned by certain ill-informed critics. As it frequently happens, the 
media and broader community were interested in sensationalism and controversies. Here, 
we mention two that were linked to the issues of genetic heritability and intelligence. 
Disruption of Eysenck’s Talks at Melbourne University and Sydney University 
In 1977 Hans Eysenck and Arthur Jensen were invited to give talks at several 
Universities in Australia. Jensen discussed the relationship between intelligence and 
learning while Eysenck’s focus was on intelligence and behaviour therapy. At the closure 
of the “hippy era,” these authors were often misperceived as “academic racists”. Their 
first stopover was in Melbourne and from media reports it became clear that 
demonstrations protesting their positions were both relatively large and well-organised. 
Australian media reported that the speakers were physically assaulted and pelted with 
tomatoes and eggs by noisy protesters at the University of Melbourne, making it virtually 
impossible for either researcher to deliver their addresses. The next stopover was at the 
University of Sydney where Eysenck was scheduled to give two public lectures. At the 
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first talk, protestors who had gained entry into the lecture theatre were abusive and 
shouted many derogatory remarks, and while a water bomb hit the professor who was to 
introduce Eysenck to the audience, this time there was no physical attack on Eysenck 
himself. Nevertheless, the talk was cancelled due to the unruly crowd. Security 
arrangements for the second talk were increased but almost nothing could be heard due to 
the noise produced by demonstrators at the door. It was remarkable to see Eysenck keep 
his composure and behave in a dignified way in the face of such disruptive behaviour. 
For the second talk, one of the present authors (LS) organised a group of postgraduate 
students and tutors with the intention of helping the NSW police in defending Eysenck 
against violent physical attacks. When, 20 years later, the news of Hans Eysenck’s death 
reached Australia, the University of Sydney showed a film depicting the 1977 event and 
the audience in attendance in 1997 wholeheartedly agreed that the accusations of 
academic racism levelled against Eysenck were unwarranted and misplaced. 
Withholding of Cattell’s APF Gold Medal Award 
While both Eysenck and Cattell were prodigious researchers and scholars, 
Goldberg (1968, p. 618) had described Cattell as “Psychology’s Master Strategist”.  In 
recognition of Cattell’s monumental contributions to psychological science spanning 
more than seven decades, the American Psychological Foundation (comprising no fewer 
than seven past APA presidents) identified Cattell as the 1997 recipient of psychology’s 
most prestigious Gold Medal Award for Lifetime Achievement in Psychological Science. 
The official citation read as follows: 
In a remarkable 70-year career Raymond B. Cattell has made 
prodigious, landmark contributions to psychology, including factor 
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analytic mapping of the domains of personality, motivation, and 
abilities; exploration of three different media of assessment; 
separation of fluid and crystallized intelligence; and numerous 
methodological innovations. Thus, Cattell became recognized in 
numerous substantive areas, providing a model of the complete 
psychologist in an age of specialization. It may be said that Cattell 
stands without peer in his creation of a unified theory of individual 
differences integrating intellectual, temperamental, and dynamic 
domains of personality in the context of environmental and heredity 
influences. (American Psychologist, 1997, p. 797) 
 
However, in a “last minute” political attack, Cattell at 92 years of age and frail, was 
accused of academic racism, leading to the withdrawal of this final prestigious honour, 
despite his having stated unambiguously more than a decade earlier that,  
The only reasonable thing is to be noncommittal on the race question 
– that's not the central issue, and it would be a great mistake to be 
sidetracked into all the emotional upsets that go on in discussions of 
racial differences. We should be quite careful to dissociate eugenics 
from it – eugenics' real concern should be with individual differences. 
(Cattell, 1984, “Interview with R. B. Cattell,” para. 18) 
 
In analysing the unsolicited, derogatory accusations that resulted in the withholding 
of Cattell’s APF Gold Medal Award, Lotz (2008) concluded that, 
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Cattell was deliberately misquoted…and labelled as an academic 
racist. The views he developed in the 1930s were common among his 
contemporaries when beliefs in racial differences were widely held, 
and should not be distorted by judgment according to today’s 
standards. General scientific observations should not be read as 
personal moral statements. He was particularly wronged during the 
1990s by certain writers (William H. Tucker and Barry Mehler) who 
picked out certain references referring to Germany, Hitler or 
genocide and quoted them out of context. (p. 136) 
 
Thus, despite their monumental contributions to scientific psychology, 
both Eysenck and Cattell’s work involving the empirical measurement of 
intelligence in various cultural groups was deliberately maligned, resulting, 
for example, in the wrongful withholding of Cattell’s APF Gold Medal 
Award. In direct contrast to the derogatory accusations of such politically-
motivated detractors, Cattell (1940) had specifically constructed the Culture 
Fair Intelligence Test (CFIT) in order to minimise differences in IQ scores 
across different ethnic groups.As Richard Gorsuch wrote in his letter to the 
American Psychological Foundation, 
The charge of racism is 180 degrees off track. [Cattell] was the first 
one to challenge the racial bias in tests and to attempt to reduce that 
problem.” (Gorsuch, 1997, “Letter to the American Psychological 
Foundation,” para. 4).  
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Likewise, Eysenck was vehemently opposed to racist ideology and racism. As 
Eysenck (1997b, p. 40) specifically stated,  
My hatred of Hitler and the Nazis, and all they stood for, was so overwhelming that 
no argument could counter it. 
 
In collaborating in a professional capacity on research projects with either Hans 
Eysenck and/or Raymond Cattell over many years (and in some instances decades), the 
present authors can attest absolutely that neither Eysenck nor Cattell ever advocated 
racism, despite the ostensibly untoward asseverations of detractors, seemingly trying to 
“make a name for themselves” by denigrating and besmirching these two giants of 
twentieth century empirical psychology. 
New Developments – Vindication of Eysenck and Cattell’s Views on the Biological 
Basis of Traits 
Recent developments in the molecular genetics of complex traits have lent new 
support to the emphasis that both Eysenck and Cattell placed on the importance of 
genetic factors underlying individual differences in both intelligence and personality. The 
evidence in their day came entirely from results of family, adoption, and particularly twin 
studies, all of which were subjected to fierce criticisms by detractors.  
 From about 1990, researchers started to go beyond estimating heritability (the 
proportion of total variation due to genetic causes) in the attempt to identify the actual 
genes causing variations in behaviour. Two approaches were tried. First, candidate gene 
studies, in which the researcher guessed what sort of genes might be involved, genotyped 
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them in phenotyped samples and tested for association. The second approach was genetic 
linkage analysis which is hypothesis free, being agnostic as to which particular genes are 
involved, and entails testing for co-segregation within families of a trait with markers 
typed at regular intervals across all chromosomes. In principle, linkage analysis should 
detect any contributing gene signal, but in practice, impossibly large sample sizes are 
required to do so reliably, except for traits that are almost monogenic, like blue-brown 
eye colour. The abject failure of these two methods left the field despondent and puzzled, 
but provided the first glimmerings of just how small gene effects on complex traits might 
be, and provided the rationale for the only method that could detect them.  
Risch and Merikangas (1996) proposed that genes causing variation in complex 
traits like behaviour and common diseases could be found by a genome-wide association 
scan (GWAS) that entailed typing genetic markers called single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) at high density right across the human genome and testing for 
association with each and every one of them (cf. Berg, van den et al., 2014). It took 
almost another decade before the technology to enable this became widely available, in 
the form of “SNP chips” – microarrays that could type initially 10,000 SNPs, then 
100,000, and eventually a million or more markers. The very first success with the 
GWAS technique was for age related macular degeneration (AMD) the most common 
form of blindness in old people (Hoh & Ott, 2003; Klein et al., 2005), and obtained with 
a sample of only 96 cases with severe AMD and 50 controls. This gave the impression 
that finding complex trait genes would be easy, but subsequent success required much 
larger samples because the causal genes had small effects.  For height, a trait with about 
the same heritability as IQ (0.80), it was only when the GWAS sample size got to around 
 
 
26 
 
14,000 cases that genes began to be identified, but with more than 300,000 individuals 
now genotyped, around 700 genes have been identified as affecting adult height.  
While we still do not have genotyped samples that large for intelligence (IQ), we 
do have very large samples phenotyped for educational attainment since this is a standard 
socio-demographic covariate collected in many biomedical and behavioural studies. 
Educational attainment (scored as number of years of schooling or simply as the binary 
yes/no variable “Did you go to college?” (in the north American sense) correlates with 
psychometric IQ scores about 0.5 and can be regarded as a proxy – the imperfect 
correlation being compensated for by the much larger sample sizes available for 
educational attainment.   
The first GWAS study of educational attainment (N = 126,000) identified a 
number of associated SNPs (Rietveld et al., 2013). An expanded replication study with 
(N = 305,000) – (Rietveld et al., 2014) found more than 70 significant SNPs for 
educational attainment and a high genetic correlation with IQ scores (rG = .70). 
Interestingly it also showed a genetic correlation with intracranial volume of 0.23, 
confirming one of Eysenck’s prognostications on the biological basis of intelligence. 
Perhaps most interesting was the strong negative genetic correlation with Neuroticism 
(rG = -0.41) highlighting that in addition to high IQ, emotional stability also contributes 
positively to high educational attainment.  
Although individual SNPs may contribute only slightly to the variance in 
educational attainment, it is the cumulative effect of multiple SNPs which has greater 
predictive influence. As Domingue et al. (2015, p. 2) commented,  
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The individual genetic variants discovered exhibited only very small effects on 
educational attainment, consistent with findings from GWASs of other complex 
traits ranging from body mass index to schizophrenia. But the results of the GWAS 
are not limited to the handful of SNPs identified. It is possible to combine 
information from all of the SNPs analysed in the GWAS to calculate a “polygenic 
score” that summarizes genome-wide genetic predisposition to educational 
attainment. 
 
Until recently, less progress had been made unravelling the genes behind 
personality traits. However, a large international Genetics of Personality Consortium with 
collectively 63,661 participants from 29 discovery cohorts and 9,786 participants from a 
replication cohort measured for Neuroticism and Extraversion found a genome-wide 
significant SNP for Neuroticism (de Moor et al., 2015) in both the discovery meta-
analysis, and in the meta-analysis of all 30 cohorts. As de Moor et al. (p. 642) stated,  
Common genetic variants explain 15% of the variance in neuroticism. Polygenic 
scores based on the meta-analysis of neuroticism in 27 cohorts significantly 
predicted neuroticism...in the 2 other cohorts… neuroticism is influenced by many 
genetic variants of small effect that are either common or tagged by common 
variants. 
 
In regard to detecting underlying causal genes for Extraversion, van den Berg et 
al. (2015, Abstract) in a large GWAS meta-analysis based on a combined sample (N = 
63,030) reported that, 
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Extraversion is a highly polygenic personality trait, with an architecture possibly 
different from other complex human traits, including other personality traits. 
Future studies are required to further determine which genetic variants, by what 
modes of gene action, constitute the heritable nature of extraversion. 
 
Breaking news from the UK Biobank (N = 91,000), all measured with the 12-item 
short-form of the Eysenck Neuroticism scale and typed on a single chip in a single 
laboratory, has finally produced a breakthrough with one very large hit and around eight 
smaller ones for Neuroticism. Congruent with Eysenck’s rationale of Neuroticism as the 
trait underlying clinical depression, the genetic correlation between the two has been 
measured at rG = .64.  
Summary 
Eysenck’s tireless efforts to improve the measurement of the biological correlates 
of personality and intelligence have led to a better understanding of the causes of 
individual differences. Likewise, Cattell’s exhaustive efforts to map out a factor-
analytically derived taxonomy of personality and ability traits has greatly enhanced our 
understanding of such constructs. With recent discoveries of specific genetic markers 
(SNPs), we can see that both Eysenck and Cattell’s scientific interest and emphasis on the 
biological basis of individual differences in human personality and cognition are now 
finding confirmation in the modern era of molecular genetics and big science. What 
better vindication of one’s scientific programme/heuristic could any dedicated scientist 
wish for? 
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